Jared, I need to be completely honest with you. I appreciate your insights, and your ability to frame these debates in a way that makes them accessible without losing depth. But reading the news these past few days—and seeing how U.S. trade policy has played out over the last few years—has put me in such a state that I apparently blacked out and wrote this entire essay-length comment. I can only assume my subconscious, outraged by the sheer absurdity of watching America punch its allies in the face again, took over my hands and started typing in a fit of despair.
It is appalling to see allies and close friends—Canada, Mexico, the EU—treated with such disdain, as though they were trade adversaries rather than partners essential to our economic and geopolitical security. And while Trump’s return has escalated things to an extreme, let’s be real: the groundwork for this moment wasn’t just laid by Trump. It was also shaped, in part, by the trade policy under the Biden administration.
I know the political climate was difficult. I know that after 2016, “free trade” became politically toxic in both parties. But what I struggle with is how the Biden administration—rather than correcting the reckless protectionism of the Trump years—chose instead to validate it in too many ways. Rather than making the case for a strategic, pro-allies trade agenda, the administration hesitated. It retreated into a defensive crouch, leaning into tariffs, Buy America provisions, and an industrial policy that often signaled to our closest allies that they were an afterthought, not a priority.
And here’s where I have to talk about Katherine Tai.
I get that she was navigating a tough political reality. But her tenure at USTR felt defined by indecision and missed opportunities. Instead of reasserting U.S. leadership in global trade—rejoining the CPTPP, pushing for a deeper economic partnership with Europe, offering real market access in IPEF—she presided over a trade policy that was largely protectionist, reactive, and unambitious. The idea that the U.S. could somehow counter China without building deeper economic ties with its allies never made sense. And yet, that’s effectively the approach the administration took.
Then there was the tariff question. Keeping Trump’s tariffs in place was bad enough, but Tai’s insistence that tariffs weren’t driving up prices was, frankly, damaging. The data said otherwise. Multiple studies said otherwise. And yet, rather than make the politically tough but necessary argument that tariff relief could ease inflation, she gave Trump an open lane to claim vindication. If Biden’s own trade representative wasn’t willing to say that protectionism was costly, how could Democrats expect to run against it?
And now, in 2025, we’re living in the consequences. Trump is back, escalating trade wars on all fronts, dragging the U.S. further into economic isolationism, and alienating allies at precisely the moment we need them most. And the most frustrating part? This could have been prevented. The alternative was there all along: a strategic trade agenda, one that balanced industrial policy with real economic integration, one that prioritized friends over tariffs, one that understood trade as a tool for collective strength, not a zero-sum battleground. But that path required boldness. It required taking political risks. And for the most part, those risks weren’t taken.
I know you understand all this better than almost anyone. At some point, we have to ask: What happens when those constraints become the policy itself? Because that’s what I fear happened with Biden’s trade approach. The administration didn’t just acknowledge the post-2016 protectionist shift—it internalized it. And in doing so, it left the door open for Trump to return and take things even further.
So where do we go from here? I completely agree with you that we need to be louder about the economic costs of sweeping tariffs. But I’d take it a step further: someone—anyone—needs to start making the full-throated, unapologetic case for trade as a source of American strength, not a political liability. Right now, the debate is entirely shaped by its opponents. And unless that changes, we’re just going to keep losing ground—economically, diplomatically, and strategically.
Some very substantial food for thought here. Let me cogitate and reply later. I find these sentences particularly interesting and challenging:
"But I’d take it a step further: someone—anyone—needs to start making the full-throated, unapologetic case for trade as a source of American strength, not a political liability. Right now, the debate is entirely shaped by its opponents."
Jared, I need to be completely honest with you. I appreciate your insights, and your ability to frame these debates in a way that makes them accessible without losing depth. But reading the news these past few days—and seeing how U.S. trade policy has played out over the last few years—has put me in such a state that I apparently blacked out and wrote this entire essay-length comment. I can only assume my subconscious, outraged by the sheer absurdity of watching America punch its allies in the face again, took over my hands and started typing in a fit of despair.
It is appalling to see allies and close friends—Canada, Mexico, the EU—treated with such disdain, as though they were trade adversaries rather than partners essential to our economic and geopolitical security. And while Trump’s return has escalated things to an extreme, let’s be real: the groundwork for this moment wasn’t just laid by Trump. It was also shaped, in part, by the trade policy under the Biden administration.
I know the political climate was difficult. I know that after 2016, “free trade” became politically toxic in both parties. But what I struggle with is how the Biden administration—rather than correcting the reckless protectionism of the Trump years—chose instead to validate it in too many ways. Rather than making the case for a strategic, pro-allies trade agenda, the administration hesitated. It retreated into a defensive crouch, leaning into tariffs, Buy America provisions, and an industrial policy that often signaled to our closest allies that they were an afterthought, not a priority.
And here’s where I have to talk about Katherine Tai.
I get that she was navigating a tough political reality. But her tenure at USTR felt defined by indecision and missed opportunities. Instead of reasserting U.S. leadership in global trade—rejoining the CPTPP, pushing for a deeper economic partnership with Europe, offering real market access in IPEF—she presided over a trade policy that was largely protectionist, reactive, and unambitious. The idea that the U.S. could somehow counter China without building deeper economic ties with its allies never made sense. And yet, that’s effectively the approach the administration took.
Then there was the tariff question. Keeping Trump’s tariffs in place was bad enough, but Tai’s insistence that tariffs weren’t driving up prices was, frankly, damaging. The data said otherwise. Multiple studies said otherwise. And yet, rather than make the politically tough but necessary argument that tariff relief could ease inflation, she gave Trump an open lane to claim vindication. If Biden’s own trade representative wasn’t willing to say that protectionism was costly, how could Democrats expect to run against it?
And now, in 2025, we’re living in the consequences. Trump is back, escalating trade wars on all fronts, dragging the U.S. further into economic isolationism, and alienating allies at precisely the moment we need them most. And the most frustrating part? This could have been prevented. The alternative was there all along: a strategic trade agenda, one that balanced industrial policy with real economic integration, one that prioritized friends over tariffs, one that understood trade as a tool for collective strength, not a zero-sum battleground. But that path required boldness. It required taking political risks. And for the most part, those risks weren’t taken.
I know you understand all this better than almost anyone. At some point, we have to ask: What happens when those constraints become the policy itself? Because that’s what I fear happened with Biden’s trade approach. The administration didn’t just acknowledge the post-2016 protectionist shift—it internalized it. And in doing so, it left the door open for Trump to return and take things even further.
So where do we go from here? I completely agree with you that we need to be louder about the economic costs of sweeping tariffs. But I’d take it a step further: someone—anyone—needs to start making the full-throated, unapologetic case for trade as a source of American strength, not a political liability. Right now, the debate is entirely shaped by its opponents. And unless that changes, we’re just going to keep losing ground—economically, diplomatically, and strategically.
Some very substantial food for thought here. Let me cogitate and reply later. I find these sentences particularly interesting and challenging:
"But I’d take it a step further: someone—anyone—needs to start making the full-throated, unapologetic case for trade as a source of American strength, not a political liability. Right now, the debate is entirely shaped by its opponents."